I came to this three-volume group at the beginning of my research career, in 1979. I had just begun a Ph.D under the direction of Professor Bryan Ranft, at King’s College London, and a great servant of the Record Society. After planning to research an early 20th century subject I developed an interest in the Baltic Campaigns of the misnamed ‘Crimean’ war, and the career of the Admiral Sir Charles Napier (1786-1860) whose command of the Baltic Fleet in 1854 ended in controversy.
The texts of these three volumes, an edited selection of the higher level correspondence between the Admiralty and the Commanders in Chief of the Baltic and the Black Sea Theatres, was created by the Admiralty in 1855-56 as a Cabinet print, in part to meet the well-founded complaints of Admiral Napier, who had entered Parliament for a second time as MP for Southwark and was asking awkward questions in the House. Napier was a long-standing friend of Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, which made the issue especially difficult. Copies can be found among the papers of some contemporary cabinet ministers. The volumes were produced during the Second World War, when opportunities for original research were limited, much as they are in 2020.
The volumes deal with every aspect of the naval war from the economic blockade to major amphibious operations, the siege of Sevastopol, the capture of the Aland Islands, the bombardments of Sweaborg and Kinburn, gunboat operations in the Sea of Azov and the Naval Brigade outside Sevastopol. The much larger body of surviving official correspondence from which they were drawn, can be read at the National Archives of the United Kingdom.
The Baltic material was edited by the Navy Records Society stalwart and Admiralty Librarian David Bonner-Smith, whose voluminous research notes survive in the National Maritime Museum archives. In the 1854 volume Bonner-Smith noted how the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir James Graham MP edited the correspondence to promote his own agenda, ensure the public saw things as he would wish, while breaching the confidence of private correspondence with Napier to undermine the Admiral’s credibility in the Cabinet. Napier, and the Commander in Chief in the Black Sea Sir James Dundas, were sacrificed as scapegoats to disguise Graham’s responsibility for the failure to mobilise in good time, the lack of sailors and of ships, especially the gunboats and mortar vessels that were needed for offensive operations in coastal waters. Graham’s obsession with economical administration crippled the British war effort in 1854, his plans were based on the flawed assumption that allies would be found in the Baltic, to provide the manpower, local expertise and flotilla craft that were needed. He imagined using the same forces in two theatres, in successive seasons, whereas the war had to be fought in both consecutively. The failure to take Sevastopol in October 1854 exposed the folly of inadequate preparation, and ultimately brought down the Government. Graham left office for the last time in February 1855, and his reputation was badly damaged by Napier’s subsequent attacks.
While my Ph.D focussed on the Baltic campaigns, the book developed from the thesis examined the strategic direction of the conflict and the two primary theatres, the better to establish the significance of the Baltic at every stage of the war, from planning to post-war celebrations at a Royal Fleet Review at Spithead on April 23rd 1856, when a massive Baltic Fleet was assembled to demonstrate the power of the British state. I continue to work on the career of Admiral Napier, naval reformer, MP, mercenary, pioneer of new technology, author, and the man who fired the rockets in the American National Anthem.
I have chosen the last letter from the 1854 Baltic section (p.197) as a masterpiece of official obfuscation, hair splitting and straight-forward dishonesty.
The Admiralty, still presided over by Sir James Graham, rejected Napier’s complaints, set out in the previous letter, and declared the issue closed. It was not… although the Admiralty’s actions did much to ensure the Baltic campaigns were largely forgotten, leaving the army’s chaotic Crimean campaign to define the entire conflict. This collection, and the expert editing it received, opened a new perspective on the past, and provided the foundation for more rounded national perspective.
Andrew, I am in the process of writing a biography of my ancestor William Schaw Lindsay MP (1815-1877). He was a friend of Napier’s and had quite a bit to say about him in his diaries. I’ll dig out the relevant extracts for you.
Lindsay was a shipbroker and shipowner and owned one of the largest shipping companies in Britain in the 1850s.
A few of his ships were used as transport ships in the Crimean War. One of which was the SS Robert Lowe which transported Florence Nightingale; she nicknamed the ship the Robert Slow in her impatience to get to the seat of war. He also assisted the French, chartering ships for them.
Lindsay had quite a few run ins with the Admiralty about its mismanagement of the war. He also was a leading member of the Administrative Reform Group.
Bill
This from Lindsay’s diary LND 4-2 P.287
“Talking of the Baltic Fleet – it was like the whole affair of the Crimean War – a gigantic bungle. We started our Fleet under the command of Sir Charles with the most useless and most worthless crews that ever manned British Ships of War so far as regards the bulk of the men who had been shipped as seamen. Then, we sent a class of ships totally unfit for the work we had undertaken. Then there was a great diner at the Reform Club in honour of Sir Charles before the fleet sailed with Sir James Graham the First Lord of the Admiralty in the Chair at which a great deal of empty bombast and nonsense was talked. Then we raised a tremendous hue and cry against Sir Charles because he did not destroy Cronstadt with ships that could not reach it with their guns – and at last we recalled him because he did not perform impossibilities.”
Lindsay has much more to say about Napier.
Another snippet from William Schaw Lindsay’s (1815-1877) Journals :-
“Talking of the Baltic Fleet – it was like the whole affair of the Crimean War – a gigantic bungle. We started our Fleet under the command of Sir Charles with the most useless and most worthless crews that ever manned British Ships of War so far as regards the bulk of the men who had been shipped as seamen. Then, we sent a class of ships totally unfit for the work we had undertaken.
There was a great diner at the Reform Club in honour of Sir Charles before the fleet sailed with Sir James Graham the First Lord of the Admiralty in the Chair at which a great deal of empty bombast and nonsense was talked.
We raised a tremendous hue and cry against Sir Charles because he did not destroy Cronstadt with ships that could not reach it with their guns – and at last we recalled him because he did not perform impossibilities. Sir Charles, I see refers to this in one of his notes which I have preserved.”
He continues:-
“I have said that Sir Charles was blunt often to rudeness. I remember a very glaring instance of this which happened at my own table. It was at one of those formal Parliamentary dinners – stupid affairs at best but such as must be given now and again when within the political ring. Amongst the number present was Mr Adams the American minister, Lord Goderich, Lord Bovey, Sir Clarence Paget, Mr Liddell and Sir Charles Napier – altogether either 22 or 24 gentlemen some of whom were strangers to each other. After dinner the subject of conversation turned to the Crimean War when Sir Charles gave us his experience in the Baltic. Amongst other incidents of the cruise he prided himself in the achievement that though he did not capture nor destroy Cronstadt he lost none of his ships as many people had said he would do: “but” he added addressing especially the American Minister and looking hard at Lord Clarence Paget who sat opposite to him “that chief there” pointing to Paget, “got his ship on the shore – and did not ken how to get her off again for I had to gang and help him; and that was our ‘only mishap’.!!” Poor Paget did not know where to look or what to say but he prudently said nothing : and I saw Mr Adams felt for him as we all did except Sir Charles who did not seem to feel that he had said anything that could injure anybody’s feeling. It was quite true that the line of battle ship which Lord Clarence had commanded in the Baltic was the only vessel of the Fleet which got ashore and that Sir Charles had gone on board to give directions but he had no need to relate the incident at the house and in the manner he did. Paget never forgave him for the insult and no wonder – they continued on speaking terms but nothing more.”
Much more in WSLs Journals on Sir Charles.
Thanks for that… Paget was one of the young captains from aristocratic backgrounds who though they knew more about seamanship and war than Napier, who had seen twenty years of war spread across five decades, won major battles, and captured towns in America and Portugal. Napier was making an important point. Paget was over promoted, his father was Led Anglesey, and not much of a seaman. Paget was an effective political, but no-one rated his ship handling skills.